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I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been made recently of the deficiencies of international law
in grappling with violence perpetrated by non-state actors. From
transnational terrorist networks to private security contractors (PSCs),
organizations that are not officially part of the apparatus of any state are
increasingly engaged in protracted episodes of intense violence, giving
rise to questions of accountability under international law. Does
international law provide rules applicable to such conduct?
While the repression of crime, especially that perpetrated by non-state
actors, has traditionally been left to the internal law of states, most
international jurists will point to the ancient rules of international law
pertaining to piracy to support the proposition that international law has
always governed criminal activity by non-state actors. Today, these
same jurists can point to Article 25(2) of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court which provides for individual criminal
responsibility of perpetrators without any reference to state affiliation.
In light of the correspondence between these ancient and modem rules
of international law, why is there such controversy over the question of
the responsibility of non-state actors under international criminal law?
In order to understand the controversy, it is essential first to recognize
that Grotius' condemnation of pirates as guilty of violating the law of
nations had a very different legal character from the concept of individual
criminal responsibility under the Rome Statute. For Grotius, the pirate
was guilty of violating natural law,1 a body of law that bound individuals
in the first place, and only by extension from this central case formed
part of the law of nations applicable to states. Once the foundation of
international law shifted from natural law to positivism, the focus of the
international rules concerning piracy shifted from the individual to the
state. Rather than focusing on individual responsibility, the rules of
international law were understood to afford jurisdiction to all states to
repress piracy.
By the early 20th century, the natural law conception of the
international legal system had receded to the vanishing point, so much so
that delegates to the League of Nations could take the view that
"inasmuch as only States were subjects of international law, individuals
1. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ACPACIS, bk. II, ch. XX, §. XL (1625).
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could only be punished in accordance with their national law." 2 The
significance of the Nuremberg Tribunal's revival of the concept of
individual criminal responsibility can be fully appreciated only when
seen against this state-centric backdrop.
II. THE POSITIVIST CONCEPTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM, AND THE SCOPE OF THE TERM
"NON-STATE ACTOR"
From the inception of the Westphalian system in 1648, the sovereign
equality of states and the related principle of non-intervention were
paramount. As the positivist conception of the international legal system
came to prevail, only states could be deemed true subjects of
international law, with individuals generally relegated to the status of
mere objects. 3  The substantive norms of international law therefore
were conceived as a network of consent-based, reciprocal obligations
that focused almost exclusively on inter-state relations.
According to this traditional model, international law had no direct
application to individuals. At the same time, states, as abstract entities,
are incapable of acting as such. The conduct of states is the conduct of
individuals whose acts or omissions are attributable to the state.4
2. Report of the International Law Commission on Question of International
Criminal Jurisdiction, 17, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/15 (1950),
reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1 [hereinafter Report on Question of
International Criminal Jurisdiction].
3. The legal status of the individual in the pre-World War II international legal
system is a matter of some debate. The individual was regarded as a subject of natural
law, and was thus regulated by international law to the extent the Westphalian system
was superimposed onto a pre-existing natural law system. See John Cerone, The Status
of the Individual in International Law, 100 ASIL PROC. 257, 259-260 (2006). The scope
of the present chapter is limited to rules of positive international law, and includes
natural law only to the extent it has been incorporated into the positive law.
4. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, International Law Comm'n, art. 4, adopted in G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002). Draft Articles on Responsibility and Commentary are
reprinted in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TExT AND COMMENTARIES 61 (2002)) [hereinafter
ARTICLES AND COMMENTARY]; see also John Cerone, Human Dignity in the Line of Fire:
The Application of International Human Rights Law During Armed Conflict, Occupation, and
Peace Operations, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1447, 1455 (2006).
A. "State Actors" and "Non-State Actors"
The term "state actor" is traditionally employed to describe those who
are officially part of the machinery of the state. The conduct of these
individuals is generally attributable to the state.5 The term "non-state
actor" (NSA) is employed to describe those who are not officially part of
the machinery of the state, and whose conduct is not generally
attributable to the state. As a brief survey of the rules of attribution will
demonstrate, however, there is no category of individuals whose conduct
is always attributable to the state; nor is there a category of individuals
whose conduct is never attributable to the state.6
The first rule of attribution is that the conduct of an organ of a state,
including that of any individual who is an official part of the machinery
of the state,7 or of an entity legally empowered by a state to exercise
elements of governmental authority, is considered to be an act of that
state. This would also include situations in which an organ is placed at
the disposal of a state by another state and the organ is acting in the
exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the former state.
9
Even where an actor's conduct is ultra vires, or beyond the scope of his
or her authority, so long as he or she was acting in an official capacity
the conduct of such actor is attributable to the state.' 0
The conduct of non-state actors may also be attributed to a state under
certain circumstances. The conduct of a non-state actor may be imputed
to a state when the actor is "in fact acting on the instructions of, or under
the direction or control of, [a] state in carrying out the conduct"; 1 when
the actor is "in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in
5. See ARTICLES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 5, art. 4.
6. See generally ARTICLES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 6.
7. See id. art. 4.
8. Id. art. 5.
9. Id. art. 6. This rule is limited to situations in which "the organ, originally that
of one State, acts exclusively for the purposes of and on behalf of another State and its
conduct is attributed to the latter State alone." Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
10. Id. art. 7. See also Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras Case, 1988 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, paras. 169-70 (July 29, 1988).
11. ARTICLES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 5, art. 8. In the absence of specific
instructions, a fairly high degree of control has been required to attribute the conduct to
the state. According to the Commentary on the Articles,
['s]uch conduct will be attributable to the State only if it directed or controlled
the specific operation and the conduct complained of was an integral part of
that operation. The principle does not extend to conduct which was only
incidentally or peripherally associated with an operation and which escaped
from the State's direction or control.'
Id. at 110.
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the absence or default of the official authorities"; 12 when the conduct is
subsequently adopted by a state;13 or when "[t]he conduct [is that] of an
insurrectional movement which becomes the new government of a
State."14
An example of attribution of the conduct of NSAs may be seen in the
use of private contractors in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
1 5
The rules of attribution contemplate two situations in which the conduct
of private contractors may be attributable to the state.
One situation in which the conduct of private contractors may be
attributable to the state arises whenever the contractor is de jure acting
on behalf of the state. This situation is covered by article five of the
Articles on State Responsibility, which applies to entities that are
empowered by the law of the state to exercise elements of governmental
authority.' 6 The conduct of private contractors that are legally authorized to
carry out public functions on behalf of the state will therefore be
attributable to the state. These entities are essentially assimilated to
organs of the state when they are acting in their public capacity. Their
ultra vires conduct therefore remains attributable to the state so long as
they are acting in that capacity.
A second situation in which the conduct of private contractors may be
attributable to the state arises where the contractor is, in fact, authorized
to act on behalf of the state, without the official imprimatur of legal
empowerment. It does not matter whether the contractor is carrying out
a public function in such situations. 17 This situation would be governed
by article eight of the Articles, however, which, as noted above, sets a
fairly high threshold for attribution. In addition, as there is not necessarily
any "official" capacity in such situations, the entity's conduct will not be
attributable to the state if such conduct was contrary to the state's
instructions. 1 8
12. Id. art. 9.
13. Id. art. 11. See also Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1979 I.C.J. 3, 19 (Dec. 15), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/64/6283.pdf.
14. ARTICLES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 5, art. 10.
15. See, e.g., Victoria L. Starks, The US. Government's Recent Initiatives To
Prevent Contractors From Engaging In Trafficking In Persons: Analysis Of Federal
Acquisition Regulation Subpart 22.17, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 879, 881 n.16 (2008)
(citations omitted).
16. ARTICLES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 5, art. 5
17. Id. art. 8.
18. But see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- 1-A, Appeal Judgment, (July 15,
1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1518 (1999). In Tadic, the ICTY Appeals Chamber took
The legal position of such NSAs whose conduct in a given instance is
attributable to the state is essentially the same as that of state actors. In
any event, the rules of international law, as traditionally understood,
would not directly bind even state actors because it was the state as such
that was the subject of legal obligation. 
19
The events of World War II, however, spurred a number of developments
in international law that struck at the core structure of the system. The
two most significant developments for present purposes were the
emergence of the individual as a subject of international law and the
erosion of the non-intervention principle.
III. BEYOND THE STATE-CENTRIC MODEL: THE EMERGENCE OF
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
EROSION OF THE NON-INTERVENTION PRINCIPLE
While the state-centric model of the international legal system persists
to this day, this model was significantly eroded by the events of World
War II. One feature of this transformation was the emergence 20 of the
principle that violation of certain norms of international law could give
rise to individual criminal responsibility. Certain serious violations of
international law would engage not only the classical form of
responsibility in international law, that is, the responsibility of the state,
the position that overall control of a hierarchically-organized non-state entity may be
sufficient to assimilate that entity to a state organ, rendering all of its conduct attributable
to the state. For a comprehensive overview of these developments, see John Cerone,
"Human Dignity in the Line of Fire," 39 VAND. J.TRANSNATI'L L. 1447 (2006).
19. See, supra Part I.
20. As noted above, this principle was not generally accepted among international
lawyers in the decades prior to World War II. Early in its existence, the Council of the
League of Nations had before it a proposal to create an international criminal court. An
Advisory Committee of Jurists, appointed by the Council in February 1920,
recommended the creation of a "High Court of International Justice," which would be
competent to criminally prosecute individuals for violations of the "universal law of
nations." Report on Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 3, 15.
This proposal was rejected by the League. According to the Third Committee of the
League Assembly, it was "best to entrust criminal cases to the ordinary tribunals as is at
present the custom in international procedure." While recognizing that "crimes of this
kind" might "in future be brought within the scope of international penal law,"
consideration of the issue was, "at the moment, premature." Id 16. (italics omitted).
According to UN Special Rapporteur Richard Alfaro, this rejection
"reflected the views of those who had opposed the establishment of an
international jurisdiction for the trial of the First World War criminals, for
certain legal reasons, to wit: that there was no defined notion of international
crimes; that there was no international penal law; that the principle nullapoena
sine lege would be disregarded; that the different proposals were not clear; and
that inasmuch as only States were subjects of international law, individuals
could only be punished in accordance with their national law."
Id. 17.
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but also that of the individuals perpetrating the violation. Such perpetrators
could be criminally prosecuted and punished for these violations of
international law.
The emergence of this principle was driven by the need to develop
effective means of enforcement. As reasoned by the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, "Crimes against international law are committed
by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced."2 1
While the IMT lacked a solid juridical basis for espousing the principle
of individual criminal responsibility, subsequent acceptance of the
principle by the international community arguably cured any defect in its
legal foundation.
The IMT had at least two potential paths to deriving individual
criminal liability for violations of international law. One possible path
contemplated that individual criminal responsibility was predicated on a
violation of international law by the state. Once a violation was established,
the adjudicator could then inquire as to whether the violation was serious
enough to give rise to the criminal responsibility of the individual as
well as that of the state. The other jurisprudential strand drew upon
remnants of the natural law system, positing that some of the rules of the
"law of nations" were addressed directly to individuals. Under this latter
theory, it would not be necessary to first establish that a violation of
international law had been committed by a state. While this approach
would seem to have a weaker foundation in the positive law of the
22 2time, it appears to be the position adopted by the Tribunal.2 3
21. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL: NUREMBERG 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, at 223 (1947), available
at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject menus/imt.asp [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS].
22. As noted above, earlier conceptions of individual responsibility for violations
of the "law of nations," rested on a conception of the latter as consisting primarily of
natural law. Even this pre-existing doctrine was unclear and not without controversy.
For example, the traditional prohibition of piracy in international law is often cited as an
example of the regulation of non-state actors by international law. Yet it remains unclear
whether the rules of international law were directly binding on the pirates or whether
these rules merely provided to states a jurisdictional basis to prosecute them. In common
law jurisdictions, as customary international law was applied through the vehicle of the
common law, it is difficult to tell whether individual criminal responsibility arose
through international law itself or through the common law. To further confuse matters,
customary international law and the common law were both rooted, traditionally, in
natural law, which was primarily addressed to individuals. In any event, the principle of
individual criminal responsibility for violations of international law was not universally
Once the link between state responsibility and individual responsibility is
severed, the significance of the distinction between state and non-state
actors greatly diminishes. Much of this significance had related to a
conception of international law in which the state was the exclusive
subject of legal obligation. The distinction mattered in that context
because the conduct of state actors was generally attributable to the state,
while the conduct of non-state actors was generally not. Once the individual
is deemed capable of being directly bound by rules of international law,
it essentially becomes a policy choice of those creating the law whether
they wish to address rules of international law to all individuals or only
to individuals falling within certain categories or operating within
certain contexts. The issue is no longer one of legal coherence, but
rather of the more discretionary matter of why certain criminal activity
should be regulated by international law.
The IMT Charter primarily adopts a context-based approach. Although
the Charter recognized the individual as a subject of international
obligations, it still reflected the existing substance of international law as
a body of rules concerned almost exclusively with inter-state transactions.
In addition, the Charter restricted the Tribunal's personal jurisdiction to
those who were "acting in the interests of the European Axis countries. 24
Several aspects of the IMT's jurisdiction therefore narrowed the scope of
possible defendants to those who had some connection to the state.
The subject matter jurisdiction of the IMT was largely concerned with
state-sponsored violence. The IMT was given jurisdiction to prosecute
three categories of crimes: Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and
Crimes Against Humanity. 25 The inclusion of Crimes Against Peace and
War Crimes was not particularly controversial, as each entailed a
embraced as positive law until after World War II. Today, of course, the principle of
individual criminal responsibility is clearly regarded as positive law. See Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court art. 25(2), July 17 1988, 2178 U.N.T.S. 3.
23. The IMT's peculiar legal posture makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions as
to the nature of its jurisdiction. While the IMT purported to sit as an international
tribunal applying international law directly to individuals, it simultaneously relied on the
fact that, in constituting the tribunal, the Allies had "done together what any one of them
might have done singly." TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 22, at 218.
The Judgment also refers to the creation of the Charter as "the exercise of the sovereign
legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally
surrendered; and the undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied
territories has been recognized by the civilized world." Id. Taken together, these
propositions blur the line between an international tribunal and a domestic court. The
attendant uncertainty may have facilitated the Tribunal's invocation of the principle of
individual responsibility.
24. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Oct. 6, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, available at http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/avalon/imt/
judlawch.asp [hereinafter IMT Charter].
25. Id.
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substantial transnational dimension, either the use of armed force by one
state against another or abuses committed by someone acting on behalf
of one state against the citizen of another. This transnational dimension
placed these acts within the traditional inter-state framework of international
law.
The inclusion of Crimes Against Humanity, however, which comprised
certain inhumane acts committed in the course of an attack against any
civilian population, was a watershed event in international law. Use of
the term "any" made clear that such crimes could be committed even within
26a single state. In addition, the definition did not require that the
perpetrator have any connection to the state. 2 The boldness of including
this crime, however, was tempered by the insertion of a jurisdictional
element.
Recognizing that they were breaking new ground, the drafters expressed a
28
degree of caution by including a nexus requirement. Crimes Against
Humanity could only be prosecuted if they were committed "in execution of
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal." 29
In other words, there had to be a connection to a traditional inter-state
violation for the Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over this newly defined
category of crimes.
Each of the categories of crimes thus required some connection to
state-sponsored violence, either as a substantive element or as a
jurisdictional requirement. This was only reinforced by the Charter's
restriction of personal jurisdiction to those who were "acting in the
interests of the European Axis countries."
30
Thus, even though individual non-state actors could be prosecuted for
their participation in violations of international law, it was still necessary
to show some link31 to the state in determining whether they fell within
the Tribunal's jurisdiction.32
26. Id.
27. Id. art. 6(c).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. art. 6.
31. This link, of course, need not rise to the level required by the rules of
attribution. As the concern here was not state responsibility, the rules of international
criminal law were not constrained by the law of state responsibility.
32. A number of cases involving non-state actors were prosecuted by the
occupying powers in post-World War II Germany. See, e.g., United States v. Krupp
(The Krupp Case), 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1949) (Military Tribunal, Nuernberg,
Subsequent developments, however, lessened the significance of whether
a given perpetrator had any connection to a state.
IV. THE POST-NUREMBERG EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
International criminal law continued to evolve in the post-war period.
This evolution occurred, in part, through the further development of
humanitarian law (i.e., the law of armed conflict).
A. The 1949 Geneva Conventions & Non-State Actors
International criminal law, born as it was in the cauldron of armed
conflict, evolved primarily from international humanitarian law (IHL),
resulting in a dynamic relationship between these two bodies of law. It
was the establishment of the International Military Tribunals in the
aftermath of World War II that spurred the development of international
criminal law. As a result, the overwhelming majority of international
crimes that were given cognizance by the international community at
that time were those relating to war, that is, criminal violations of
humanitarian law. As such, the work of the IMTs in turn facilitated the
further development of IHL.33
Germany, Oct. 1946-Apr. 1949) [hereinafter NUERNBERG TRIALS]; United States v. Flick
(The Flick Case), 6 NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra; United States v. Krauch (The Farben
Case), 8 NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra; The Zyklon B Case (Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two
Others), 1 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946). The Flick Case
tribunal saw no difficulty in prosecuting private citizens for violations of international
law. Perhaps overstating the position of the individual in international law, the Flick
tribunal held that "[i]nternational law, as such, binds every citizen just as does ordinary
municipal law." The Flick Case, supra, at 1192.
[I]t is urged that individuals holding no public offices and not representing the
State, do not, and should not come within the class of persons criminally
responsible for a breach of international law. It is asserted that international is
a matter wholly outside the work, interest, and knowledge of private
individuals. The distinction is unsound. International law, as such, binds every
citizen just as does ordinary municipal law. Acts adjudged criminal when
done by an officer of the government are criminal also when done by a private
individual. The guilt differs only in magnitude, not in quality. The offender in
either case is charged with personal wrong and punishment falls on the
offender in propria persona. The application of international law is no
novelty .... There is no justification for a limitation of responsibility to public
officials.
Id. However, it should be noted that, notwithstanding its protestations to the contrary,
the Flick tribunal was essentially sitting as a domestic, and not an international, court.
As such, it is more difficult to discern whether the law being applied by the tribunal was
international law as such, or rules of domestic law that had been derived from
international norms.
33. See TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 22, at 171-342.
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This development is manifest in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which
contain a number of advances over earlier IHL treaties. One advance was
the inclusion of a regime of mandatory criminal sanctions for certain
serious violations.
In the course of its judgment, the IMT at Nuremberg relied heavily on
the rules of humanitarian law set forth in the Hague Conventions of
1907. 34 While those treaties were not applicable as such to World War
II, as several of the belligerents were not parties to those treaties, the
IMT found that the rules set forth therein had acquired the status of
customary law, and that their breach gave rise to individual criminal
responsibility.35
Part of what made this finding so extraordinary is that the Hague
Conventions do not require criminal punishment for violations. Indeed,
the exclusive remedy provided for in those treaties is compensation by
the violating state.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions, building off the achievements of the
IMTs, included a special penal regime for certain violations-the so-
called "grave breaches." When a grave breach is committed, all States
Parties are obliged to seek out the perpetrators and to bring them to
justice through prosecution or extradition.36 While these rules do not
purport to directly bind individuals, they clearly show the drafters' intent
that their violation entail criminal consequences for individual perpetrators.
Nothing in the text of the Conventions limits application of the grave
breaches regime to state actors.
Another major development of the 1949 Geneva Conventions was the
inclusion of provisions expressly regulating non-international armed
34. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 3, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th century/
hague04.asp [hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
35. See generally Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of
German Major War Criminals: The Law of the Charter (1946), available at http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp.
36. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114.
75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I].
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected
by the Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
Id. art. 50.
conflicts, and, consequently, directly binding non-state organized, armed
groups.37
As noted above, at the time of the IMT judgment, existing IHL treaties
were embedded in the traditional structure of the international legal
system, and thus regulated only international (i.e., interstate) armed
conflicts. Prior to World War II, internal conflicts were generally regarded
as an internal matter. By providing that Crimes Against Humanity could
be committed against any civilian population, however, the drafters of
the IMT Charter heralded a continuing erosion of the non-intervention
principle that led to the development of the law of non-international
armed conflict.
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions sets forth standards
regulating armed conflicts "not of an international character. ' '38 Thus,
express treaty provisions now regulated even purely internal armed
conflicts. Even more significantly, the text of the article makes clear
that it binds all parties to the conflict, including non-state organized
armed groups. This was the first time that a multilateral IHL treaty asserted
that a non-state entity was bound by international law.
In light of the dynamic relationship between IHL and international
criminal law, as humanitarian law expanded to regulate the conduct of
non-state actors, so too did international criminal law increasingly
provide for their individual responsibility.3 9
B. The Genocide Convention
In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 40 The Genocide
Convention provides a definition for the crime of genocide and asserts
that it is a crime under international law.4'
The Convention provides that genocide may be committed in peace-
time, thus making clear that the existence of armed conflict is not
37. See, e.g., id. art. 3; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneval Convention IV]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Prisoners of War art.3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
38. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 38, art. 3; Geneva Convention I, supra
note 37, art. 3.
39. While it was initially unclear whether violations of Common Article 3 gave
rise to individual criminal responsibility, it has now been accepted by a number of
international criminal courts. See infra Part V. infra.
40. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime and Genocide art.
2, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at http://www.unhchr.
ch/html/menu3/b/pgenoci.htm [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
41. Id. arts. 1, 2.
[VOL. 10: 335, 2009] Much Ado About Non-State Actors
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
required as a contextual element for genocide. Even more significantly,
the Convention expressly states that genocide may be committed by a
NSA. According to Article 4 of the Convention, "[p]ersons committing
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
officials or private individuals. 43
C. Crimes Against Humanity
The legal content of Crimes Against Humanity also evolved in the
decades following World War II. Severing the link between this
category of crimes and a state of armed conflict, the 1968 Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity provides that statutes of limitations shall not
apply to crimes against humanity "whether committed in time of war or
in time of peace.""
D. The Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind
The notion of Crimes Against Humanity continued to evolve through
the work of the International Law Commission, which had been charged
with developing a draft code of international criminal law. In its final
incarnation, the Code defined Crimes Against Humanity as including
acts "instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or
group," affirming that Crimes Against Humanity need not be committed
on behalf of a state.
Other crimes included in the Draft Code were genocide, war crimes,
crimes against United Nations and associated personnel, and aggression.
Only one of these categories of crimes was expressly limited to
individuals having a connection to a state. The crime of aggression,
derived from the IMT category of Crimes Against Peace, was limited to
individuals who participate in "the planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of aggression committed by a State."
42. Id. art. 1.
43. Id. art. 4.
44. See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity art.l, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p limit.htm.
E. Torture
In apparent contrast to the trend in favor of extending international
criminal law to reach the conduct of non-state actors, the 1984
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) defined torture so as to exclude purely
private conduct. Article 1 defined "torture" as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.
4 5
This would seem to preclude purely private conduct from the scope of
the Convention. However, this does not mean that the conduct of non-
state actors is entirely excluded from its scope. Indeed, the language of
the definition makes clear that the perpetrator need not be a state actor.
There need be only some level of state involvement; even mere
acquiescence will suffice.
46
Perhaps of even greater significance is that CAT does not purport to
apply directly to individuals. It operates through the modality of domestic
legislation. All parties must "ensure that all acts of torture are offences
under its criminal law." The Convention does not assert that acts of
torture as defined therein give rise to individual criminal responsibility
in international law. As will be demonstrated below, international criminal
courts have been granted jurisdiction to prosecute torture only when
committed as a war crimes or crime against humanity.47 These courts
have found that the act of torture does not require any state involvement
48when committed as a war crime or crime against humanity.
45. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment art.I, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h cat39.htm (emphasis added).
46. In addition, the obligation to criminalize applies also to "attempt to commit
torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in
torture." Id. art. 4(1) (emphasis added). Thus, once the minimum level of state
involvement to constitute torture is established, the status of the individuals perpetrating
the crime or participating in it is irrelevant.
47. The Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor were granted jurisdiction
to prosecute torture as such. However, the Panels sat essentially as domestic courts of
East Timor.
48. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T,
Judgment (Feb. 22, 2001).
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V. THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW BY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
International criminal law has evolved rapidly in recent years. This
evolution was spurred in large part by the development of a number of
international criminal courts since the early 1990s. The International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court are competent
to prosecute all individuals, including non-state actors, who commit
crimes falling within their jurisdiction.
A. The Yugoslav Tribunal (ICTY)
The subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY includes war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity. As noted above, each category
of crimes is capable of being committed by a non-state actor, and the
Tribunal has convicted a number of such individuals.
49
By the time of the Tribunal's establishment, it was clear that genocide
and crimes against humanity could occur within a single state50 and
could be perpetrated by a non-state actor.51 The definition for genocide
was taken directly from the text of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The
49. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-A, Appeal Judgment (Sept.
27, 2007); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Appeal Judgment (Feb. 25,
2004); Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment (Apr. 3, 2008); see also
Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T &IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, 419 (abandoning the state
involvement requirement for torture as a war crime).
50. The definition of the Crimes Against Humanity in the Statute of the ICTY
includes an armed conflict requirement as a jurisdictional element. Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY
Statute]. However, the definition makes clear that the armed conflict may be international or
internal. The ICTY has also opined that this requirement is a purely jurisdictional
element, and is not part of the definition of crimes against humanity in customary
international law. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, 572
(May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Rajic, Case No. IT-95-12-R61, Review of the Indictment,
7 (Sept. 13, 1996); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 66 (Mar.
3, 2000).
51. While an early decision of the ICTY seemed to indicate that a policy was a
necessary element in sustaining a prosecution for crimes against humanity, the Appeals
Chamber rejected this. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 69-70. To the extent
a policy was required, it would have been easier to establish in a governmental context.
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definition for Crimes Against Humanity drew upon the work of the
IMTs, as well as that of the International Law Commission.
The contextual elements for Crimes Against Humanity are set forth in
the chapeau of Article 5 of the ICTY Statute. It defines crimes against
humanity as certain inhumane acts "committed in armed conflict, whether
international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian
population., 52 The ICTY has interpreted this language as requiring a
nexus between an individual's inhumane act and this broader attack.53
Thus, crimes against humanity consist of individual "acts" that, on some
essential level, form part of the attack.
54
It is this nexus requirement that distinguishes Crimes Against Humanity
from ordinary crimes, just as War Crimes are distinguished from
ordinary crimes by virtue of their connection to an armed conflict and
genocidal acts are distinguished from ordinary crimes by the special
intent required for their commission (i.e., the intent to destroy a racial,
ethnical, national, or religious group in whole or in part).
The war crimes provisions of the ICTY Statute retain a bit more of the
traditional inter-state structure of international law. When the drafters of
the Statute began to develop the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, they were faced with the challenge of determining which
violations of IHL gave rise to individual criminal responsibility. The
first category of war crimes included in the Statute was the category of
"grave breaches" as set forth in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Because
such breaches were the subject of a mandatory penal regime in the
Conventions, the drafters of those Conventions had clearly intended that
the breach of these norms should attract criminal sanctions.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber early on held that grave breaches could
only be committed in international armed conflict.55  In order to
determine whether a conflict was international or non-international, the
Appeals Chamber relied on the law of state responsibility.56 It thus
made the nature of the actor and his or her relationship to the state
significantly more relevant. At the same time, the Appeals Chamber
seemed to lower the threshold for attributing the conduct of certain non-
state actors to the state. In a departure from the rules of attribution as
formulated by the International Law Commission, the Appeals Chamber
52. ICTY Statute, supra note 50, art. 5.
53. This requirement is separate from the jurisdictional element, also set forth in
the chapeau, that an armed conflict exist at the relevant time.
54. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, 251 (July 15,
1999), available at http://www.un.orglicty/tadic/appealljudgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf.
55. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 71 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm.
56. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, T 121.
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held that overall control of a hierarchically-organized non-state entity
may be sufficient to assimilate such an entity into a state organ, rendering
all of its conduct attributable to the state.57
The other category of war crimes included in the ICTY Statute is
described simply as "[v]iolations of the laws or customs of war,
'8
essentially leaving to the judges the question of which violations of IHL
would constitute war crimes.
In the Tadic decision, the Appeals Chamber developed a framework
for analyzing which norms of IHL gave rise to individual criminal
responsibility and could therefore be prosecuted before the Tribunal.
The primary criteria set forth were the character of the norm itself, the
severity of the violation, and the interest of the international community
59in its repression.
The Appeals Chamber also made clear in that same decision that
Article 3 of the Statute potentially encompassed all of humanitarian law,
including the law of non-international armed conflict. It therefore found
that serious violations of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions could also be prosecuted under the ICTY Statute.
60
Regardless of whether an individual is prosecuted under Article 2 or
Article 3 of the Statute, the Prosecutor must demonstrate not only the
existence of the requisite type of armed conflict (i.e., either international
or non-international), but also a nexus between the alleged offence and
the armed conflict which gives rise to the applicability of international
humanitarian law.61 The ICTY has determined that such a nexus exists
where an act is closely related to an armed conflict; i.e., if the act was
committed in furtherance of an armed conflict or under the guise of an
armed conflict. The ICTY has cited several factors in this determination
including whether or not the perpetrator is a combatant, the victim is a
member of the opposing party, the act may be said to serve the ultimate
goal of a military campaign, and the crime is committed as part of or in
the context of the perpetrator's official duties.62
57. Id.
58. ICTY Statute, supra note 50, art. 3
59. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- 1-A, Appeal Judgment, 128.
60. Id. 137.
61. It should be noted, however, that unlike Crimes Against Humanity, war crimes
need not be committed as part of a broader pattern of crimes. A single act may constitute
a war crime so long as it has the requisite nexus to an armed conflict.
62. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, 59
(Feb. 22, 2001).
In light of these contextual elements, an individual's status as a state
official may be relevant in establishing the commission of crimes within
the Tribunal's jurisdiction. However, it has never been strictly required
that an individual be a state official in order to establish that a crime
within the Tribunal's jurisdiction has been committed. The question of
whether an individual is a state actor has effectively been replaced with
the question of whether an individual's act is sufficiently connected with
a context that justifies international regulation. State affiliation is just
one factor among many that may enter into that calculation.
B. The Rwanda Tribunal (ICTR)
The subject matter jurisdiction of the Rwanda Tribunal encompasses
the same three categories: War Crimes, Genocide, and Crimes Against
Humanity. 63 Significantly, however, the ICTR was established in the
context of a conflict that was deemed to be internal in nature. Thus, the
war crimes provisions of the ICTR Statute were limited to violations of
the law of non-international armed conflict-to wit, Common Article 3
and Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Tailored as
it was to the context of an internal conflict, the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Rwanda Tribunal was even less concerned with the
issue of state affiliation.
At the same time, the Rwanda Tribunal has further elaborated on the
nexus requirements for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, and
has made a number of valuable contributions to the evolving international
jurisprudence on genocide.
Providing guidance as to what sort of nexus is required for Crimes
Against Humanity, the Semanza Trial Chamber held that while the act
does not need to be committed at the same time or place as the attack, or
share the same features as the actual attack, the act must, on some
essential level, form part of the attack.64 The act does not even have to
be committed against the same population as the broader attack of which
it is a part.65 However, the act must "must, by its characteristics, aims,
63. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda arts. 2-4, S.C. Res.
955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
64. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence,
326 (May 15, 2003) (providing that "[a]lthough the act need not be committed at the
same time and place as the attack or share all of the features of the attack, it must, by its
characteristics, aims, nature, or consequence objectively form part of the discriminatory
attack."); cf Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, 251.
65. See Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, 330
(emphasizing that although the act does not have to be committed against the same
population, if it is committed against the same population, that characteristic may be
used to demonstrate the nexus between the act and the attack).
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nature, or consequence objectively form part of the discriminatory
attack.,
66
Another dimension of this nexus is found in the mens rea requirement
for Crimes Against Humanity. Again, it is the association with a widespread
or systematic overarching attack that elevates these offenses to matters
subject to international regulation.
This requirement was made express by the Bagilishema Trial
Chamber:
A mental factor specific to crimes against humanity is required to create the
nexus between an underlying offence and the broader criminal context, thus
transforming an ordinary crime into an attack on humanity itself.
... [T]he Accused mentally must include his act within the greater dimension
of criminal conduct. This means that the accused must know that his offence
forms part of the broader attack. By making his criminal act part of the attack,
the perpetrator necessarily participates in the broader attack.
67
To satisfy this mens rea element, the defendant must be aware of the
attack that makes his or her act a crime against humanity. In practice,
this means that the perpetrator must have knowledge of the attack, either
actual or constructive, and some understanding of the relationship
between his or her acts and the attack.68
The requisite nexus between an act and an attack is therefore
established in part by proving that some aspect of the attack forms the
circumstances around a certain act and makes that act part of that attack.
While proving such an aspect may be assisted by demonstrating a policy,
the existence of a policy is not required. In any event, all a prosecutor
need ultimately prove in this regard is, that given the context and
circumstances of an act, the act cannot reasonably be seen as random or
isolated.
With respect to the mens rea, the nexus between an act and an attack
is partly established through showing that the perpetrator had knowledge
66. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, 9 326.
67. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-IA-T, Judgement, TT 93-94
(June 7, 2001) (citations and paragraph numbers omitted).
68. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, 332; Prosecutor
v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment and sentence, 9 133-34 (May 21,
1999) ("The perpetrator must knowingly commit crimes against humanity in the sense
that he must understand the overall context of his act."). Under ICTY jurisprudence, the
requisite mens rea is satisfied if the perpetrator "took the risk that his acts were part of
the attack." (alteration in original.). Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A,
Judgment, 102 (June 12, 2002). The Appeals Chamber in Kunarac made clear that the
perpetrator need not know the details of the attack. Id.
of the attack. It need not be proven, however, that by the time the accused
committed the act at issue, he or she had made the legal determination
that the attack was indeed a crime against humanity.
C. The International Criminal Court (ICC)
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court sets forth the
most comprehensive codification of international criminal law to date.69
While the ICC, similar to the ad hoc tribunals, has jurisdiction to
prosecute war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, it also
maintains jurisdiction to prosecute the crime of aggression, a crime that
had not been included within the jurisdiction of an international court
since the IMTs. The crime of aggression, however, remains undefined,
and the ICC cannot prosecute this crime until the Assembly of States
Parties settles upon a definition.
70
As with the ad hocs, the crimes are addressed to all individuals, but
their scope is limited by contextual elements. The contextual element of
importance for war crimes is armed conflict. Some of the war crimes
provisions require a nexus to international armed conflict. The others
require a nexus to non-international armed conflict. In addition, the
Statute stipulates that "[t]he "Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of
war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as
part of a large-scale commission of such crimes, 71 perhaps raising the
contextual bar.
The contextual elements for Crimes Against Humanity are found in
the requirement that they be committed "as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack., 72 This definition is a bit broader than the definitions in the
ICTY and ICTR statutes in that it does not include the jurisdictional
elements of armed conflict (ICTY) or that the attack be discriminatory
(ICTR). However, the Statute narrows the definition by requiring the
existence of a policy. Article 7(2)(a) of the statute defines "[a]ttack
directed against any civilian population" as "a course of conduct involving
the multiple commission of acts ... against any civilian population,
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack.,
73
While the definition of genocide set forth in the ICC Statute does not
expressly set forth contextual elements, such elements are arguably
69. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 23.
70. See, e.g., Reports of the ICC Working Group on the Crime of Aggression.
71. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 23, art. 8.
72. Id. art. 7(1).
73. Id. art. 7(2)(a).
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implicit in the mens rea requirement for the crime. In addition, the ICC
Elements of Crimes sets forth as an element of the crime of genocide
that the "conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of
similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could
itself effect such destruction. 74
Each category of crimes therefore entails contextual elements linking
the particular act to a larger context that is deemed to warrant international
regulation. The commission of any of these crimes arguably requires
some connection to an organized power structure. In a sense, the focus
on the state has been replaced with a more realistic focus on power.
At the same time, the jurisprudence of these courts continues to evolve
in a way that broadens the reach of international criminal law. For
example, in light of the broad nexus tests formulated for war crimes and
crimes against humanity, individual perpetrators need not even be part of
a particular power structure. Their conduct need only be in some way
related to that power structure or its activities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The IMT, through its revival of a natural law concept in a positivist
era, facilitated the transformation of the principle of individual criminal
responsibility into positive law. The necessary consent of the international
community was made clear in the General Assembly affirmation of the
Nuremberg principles7 5 and codified in the Rome Statute.
Once the individual has been deemed a subject of positive international
law, the requirement of state affiliation is no longer essential to
analytical coherence. The issue becomes simply whether international
law should directly regulate the conduct of non-state actors-something
that was traditionally left to the internal law of states.
As the non-intervention principle continues to erode and as
international law penetrates more deeply into the internal sphere, the
international community is faced with the question of what sorts of
activities should be regulated by international criminal law. The international
community and the IMT's progeny have adopted a primarily context-
based approach. Thus, most international crimes are addressed to all
74. See International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part li-
B), art. 6, (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-
38CF-41D6-ABOB-68E5F9082543/0/Element of CrimesEnglish.pdf.
75. G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/236 (Dec. 11, 1946).
individuals, but the scope of these crimes is limited by contextual
elements.
There is ultimately no requirement in modem international criminal
law that a perpetrator be a state actor. The status of an individual,
however, is not necessarily irrelevant. While rules of international
criminal law are not addressed exclusively to state actors, whether or not
a perpetrator is a state actor may be relevant in establishing contextual
elements, such as whether a conflict is international for purposes of
prosecuting grave breaches, or to establish the existence of a policy for
the prosecution of Crimes Against Humanity under the Rome Statute. It
could also be relevant for crimes that are based on the status of the
victim (e.g., crimes against Prisoners of War), or in establishing certain
modes of liability, such as command responsibility, which is predicated
on a superior-subordinate relationship.
76
One of the strengths of international law is its dynamism-its capacity
to develop in response to the changing realities of international life and
the evolving values of the international community. In no other field of
international law is this more visible than in the realm of international
criminal law.
76. This type of relationship may be more easily established in the de jure
hierarchy of a state's official machinery.
